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5 Plaintiff In Pro Per,

6 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

7 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

MATTHEW R. WALSH

Plaintiff In Pro Per,

vs.

ROKOKO ELECTRONICS
(AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50,
INCLUSIVE)

Defendant

Case No.: 2:25-CV-05340-ODW-RAO

Before: Hon. Otis D. Wright II
Courtroom 5D

**MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER AGAINST DEFENDANT
ROKOKO ELECTRONICS FOR
CONTINUED ACCUSATIONS OF
FELONY MISCONDUCT OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, TO STRIKE.**

8
9
10 **BACKGROUND**

11 The Plaintiff lawfully procured all data; Rokoko simply doesn't "like" what
12 it proves. Because they cannot challenge the evidence's substance, they have
13 pivoted to attacking the Plaintiff's character. Rokoko's own counsel admitted to a
14 total lack of technical comprehension, stating the evidence "*might as well be*
15 *Russian to me.*"

16 When pressed in discovery to identify anyone capable of interpreting this
17 data, Rokoko hid behind boilerplate objections, claiming that their ability to
18 understand the facts "*is not relevant to any claims or defenses.*" It is both improper
19 and dangerous for Defendants to baselessly accuse the Plaintiff of "felony activity"
20 while simultaneously admitting they lack the basic literacy required to understand
21 the technology or evidence involved. This Court must address these scandalous
22 and uninformed smears.

23 INTRODUCTION

24 Defendants' attempt to characterize standard network auditing as
25 "wiretapping" is technically and legally absurd. Under their logic, viewing data on
26 a monitor is lawful, but observing those same packets on a network card attached
27 to the same computer is a felony—an interpretation that would criminalize every
28 IT professional and router in California. Furthermore, alleging a "Man-in-the-
29 Middle" attack in a two-party exchange is a physical impossibility; there cannot be
30 a man in the middle when only two parties exist; it's literally in the name.

31 These scandalous claims of "felonious hacking" are a transparent attempt to
32 mask Defendants' lack of technical competency and entirely avoid the substance of
33 the evidence against. Rokoko has labeled hundreds of technologically definitive
34 terms "vague and ambiguous" while simultaneously admitting the evidence "*might*
35 *as well be Russian*" to them. This is akin to a colorblind witness testifying to the

36 color of a traffic light, or a layman accusing a surgeon of "assault with a deadly
37 weapon" post-surgery because they lack the basic understanding of surgery. This
38 issue goes directly to competence. Rokoko cannot credibly claim evidence is
39 "fabricated" when they admit they simply cannot read the language it is written in.
40 This is not a legal defense; it is a scandalous character assassination fueled by
41 willful ignorance and must be stricken under FRCP 12(f).

42 Their goal is clear: to disqualify all adverse evidence from now through trial
43 and more urgently, to avoid an unsavory ruling on Plaintiff's dispositive motion
44 where they brought (a) no contrary evidence (b) no expert and; (c) have created no
45 genuine dispute.

46

47 **Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court:**

48 (a) ENTER a protective order against Rokoko:

49 a. to prevent them from continuing to make baseless, harmful and
50 claims regarding the legality of Plaintiff's evidence

51 b. to prevent them from continuing to perpetuate the "hacker"
52 narrative

53 c. to prevent them from continuing to accuse the Plaintiff of felony
54 behavior, as this is the third time.

55 (b) STRIKE the record of the above references, particularly in their Dkt #173
56 filings (more specifically but not limited to #173-3, #173-4)
57

58
59 **ARGUMENT**
60

61 **I. I. The Technological Absurdity ("The Internet Argument")**

62 The technology "Stack" which nearly every interconnected device relies
63 upon is not a crime scene: If merely observing already-existing packets between a
64 local client and a remote server is "eavesdropping," then every network diagnostic
65 tool and antivirus program—from McAfee to Windows Event Viewer to
66 Wireshark—is a felony device. To accept Defendant's conjecture and argument is
67 to criminalize the basic architecture of the internet (Network Cards, Sockets,
68 CPUs, Routers and Modems). To accept their logic and apply it to law would
69 produce only one end-result: **turning off the internet completely.**
70

71 Illustration 1.0:

The OSI Model

The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is a conceptual, seven-layer framework developed by the ISO to standardize network communications. It breaks down complex data transmission into smaller, manageable layers—from physical cabling (Layer 1) to user applications (Layer 7)—ensuring different systems can communicate, troubleshooting is simplified, and technology interoperability is maintained

		Rokoko's Logic	Reality	
7	Application Layer	Human-computer interaction layer, where applications can access the network services	Plaintiff using Rokoko Studio and it's communications and data is legal.	Rokoko software needs layers 1 - 6 to make layer 7 even possible.
6	Presentation Layer	Ensures that data is in a usable format and is where data encryption occurs	Plaintiff being aware of the data's content and structure he was just using is a felony.	The data is assembled on Plaintiff's machine, then encrypted using a two-party SSL certificate. Plaintiff holds one half of the key, Rokoko holds the other.
5	Session Layer	Maintains connections and is responsible for controlling ports and sessions	Plaintiff's antivirus and firewalls which passively handle connections are felony wiretapping tools.	The data moves passively through multiple systems and layers which can see the data before it even is transmitted to or from Rokoko. This is required design.
4	Transport Layer	Transmits data using transmission protocols including TCP and UDP	The TCP/IP and WebSockets protocols which facilitate the entire communication are felony tools.	There exists an entire network stack which requires the passive digestion of this data as network packets contain To, From, Data Payload, etc.
3	Network Layer	Decides which physical path the data will take	Each "hop" the data must travel to is a new wiretap by a third-party and are independent felonies.	For one data packet to go from Plaintiff's PC to Rokoko's servers, it passes through 12 devices. Each one of those devices are privy to that data.
2	Data Link Layer	Defines the format of data on the network	The determination of the data format by a machine means the data was analyzed by felony software layers.	The data link layer expressly deals with preparing the data for transmission across the physical layer.
1	Physical Layer	Transmits raw bit stream over the physical medium	The network card, wires, modem, local router, C.O., WAN routers are all felony wiretap devices.	For 12 hops, 55 components would be felony devices; at 60 packets per second, 4,200 felonies would be committed per second.

72

73 Illustration 1.1:

```

C:\Users\Matt>tracert cdn-studio.rokoko.com

Tracing route to cdn-studio.rokoko.com [3.169.252.38]
over a maximum of 30 hops:

  0  <1 ms    <1 ms    <1 ms    10.0.0.1
  1  9 ms     13 ms   10 ms   int-1.sntlcasm03m.netops.charter.com [142.254.176.173]
  2  9 ms     8 ms    9 ms    lag-58.sntlcaga02h.netops.charter.com [76.167.28.153]
  3  7 ms     7 ms   10 ms   lag-19.hcr02sntlcaaga.netops.charter.com [76.167.5.0]
  4  8 ms    10 ms    7 ms    lag-47.mcr11vnnzca24.netops.charter.com [76.167.5.2]
  5  10 ms   12 ms   10 ms   lag-29.rcr01tustcaft.netops.charter.com [72.129.13.2]
  6  *        *       11 ms   lag-26-10.tustca4200w-bcr00.netops.charter.com [66.109.3.232]
  7  *        *        *      Request timed out.
  8  *        *        *      Request timed out.
  9  *        *        *      Request timed out.
 10  *        *        *      Request timed out.
 11  *        *        *      Request timed out.
 12  12 ms   13 ms   12 ms   server-3-169-252-38.lax54.r.cloudfront.net [3.169.252.38]

Trace complete.

C:\Users\Matt>

```


74

75 Every piece of data Plaintiff's computer sends to Rokoko's servers in use of the software goes
76 through twelve computers/routers first.

77

78 **Observation vs. Interception:** Plaintiff did not "break in" to a third-party
 79 conversation. Plaintiff sat on his own "digital porch" (his own hardware/OS) and
 80 observed the "digital creek" (data packets) flowing on his own property to which
 81 he has the metaphorical equivalent of "water rights" over. He simply looked at that
 82 stream of data, flowing on his physical property, through it, and out into a public
 83 lake ("the internet") where no one; neither Rokoko or the Plaintiff has any control
 84 or expectation over it's accessibility or privacy.

85
 86 Illustration 2:



87
 88 *The internet is a "web" computers are interconnected and act together in concert both passively*
 89 *and actively to achieve the transmission of data. The data passes through no less than 288 layers*
 90 *from Walsh to Rokoko (accounting for the redundancy of the 7-layer OSI model). Plaintiff*
 91 *monitored the data at position 5 of 288. Each of these 288 points sees the same data Plaintiff*
 92 *observed.*

95 **II. The Legal Failures of Invoking PC § 632**

96 **First,** There was no "*Confidential Communication*": PC § 632 applies to
97 human-to-human speech where there is a "*reasonable expectation of privacy.*"
98 Background API calls and automated JSON handshakes between software and a
99 server are not "*confidential communications.*" They are technical transactions.

100
101 **Second,** the Defendant conveniently ignored the remainder of PC 632:

102
103 *“(c) For the purposes of this section, “confidential*
104 *communication” means any communication ... **confined***
105 ***to the parties** thereto ... excludes a communication made*
106 *in a public gathering .. which the parties to the*
107 *communication may reasonably expect that the*
108 *communication may be overheard or recorded.”*


109
110 For the reasons already established, technologically it would be impossible
111 for the communications to be confined to the parties as the inherent ways that the
112 internet makes communications possible in the first place (*Flanagan v. Flanagan -*
113 *27 Cal.4th 766 S085594*). Moreso, Plaintiff and Rokoko *are the parties of the*
114 *communication*, there was no disallowed, unauthorized third party listener. No
115 action of the Plaintiff changed that fact, nor the transmission or data in any
116 capacity.

117 **Third**, the internet (not the providers or their equipment themselves) is a
118 peer-to-peer operating public property; and upholds the constitutional protections
119 of freedom of speech and communication rights. In *Reno v. ACLU* 521 U.S. 844
120 (1997), the Court ruled that internet communication deserves the same high level
121 of First Amendment protection as a speaker on a street corner soapbox.

123 **III. The "Party to the Communication" Rule:**

124 Rokoko's conjecture fails at a number of turns. **First**, because the
125 communications are already in written/text format, recording in any medium falls
126 under one-party consent (18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)). The Electronic Communications
127 Privacy Act (ECPA) provides that it is not unlawful for a person to intercept an
128 electronic communication if that person is a party to the communication.

129 Illustration 3:
130



131 *The only way a “man in the middle attack” could occur, is if there is a third*
132 *person – in the middle of two authorized parties’ communication.*
133

134 **Second**, California is a "two-party" consent state for recording of
135 “**conversations**”. Just as a party to a text message conversation does not have to
136 notify the other party it was recorded in sending that message; Digital
137 communications too are already ‘in writing’. One cannot be liable for possessing
138 evidence of a written communication to which they are a party unless it is
139 "confidential." Even if the Defendant found a way to argue it is speech, since
140 Plaintiff was the one "speaking" (sending the data), he had full authority to screen
141 shot a written record his own "speech"; just as he would a text-message sent to or
142 from him.

144 **IV. The Communications Are Admissible:**

145 The Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff has a right to access the
146 communications, the content is inadmissible as it is hearsay, however, this
147 argument fails as well:

148 **First**, FRE 801(d)(2)): Statements made in a text or written format are
149 generally not considered hearsay because they *are "admissions by a party-*
150 *opponent"* and can be used directly against them.

151 **Second**, There is no expectation of privacy in sent messages. Federal and
152 state courts consistently hold that once a text is sent, the sender loses control over
153 it. In *Commonwealth v. Diego*, 166 A.3d 1259 (Pa. Super. 2017) and *State v.*

154 Patino, 93 A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014), courts ruled that individuals have no reasonable
155 expectation of privacy in sent text messages because they cannot prevent the
156 recipient from sharing or saving them.

157 **Third**, evidence obtained is admissible if it is to be used as **proof** in an
158 action for violation of the section. Precisely this is what has occurred. Rokoko
159 themselves are accused “through espionage or other means” of actually
160 intercepting in true “man in the middle” fashion and harvesting Plaintiff’s private
161 data without authorization, sending harmful code to Plaintiff’s computer and
162 misappropriation of the same. If anyone meets the criteria of CA PC 632, it is the
163 Defendant Rokoko. Therefore, obtaining proof of that violation of CA PC 632 is in
164 itself qualifying as an exception to inadmissibility thereof:

165
166 *“(d) Except as proof in an action ... evidence obtained*
167 *as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a*
168 *confidential communication ... is not admissible”*

169 //

170 **V. Witnessing A Crime Generally Does Not Create A Second Crime**

171 Rokoko is attempting to claim a "privacy right" to take Plaintiff’s data in
172 violation of the CFAA, CA PC without Plaintiff being allowed to see them do it.
173 The Penal Code was designed to protect individuals from government/corporate
174 overreach, not to protect corporations from being caught in the act of data

175 harvesting, espionage, intellectual property infringement and so forth. The
176 Defendants have been accused of multiple actions since the initial Complaint
177 which has the ability to rise to felony-level conduct.

178 To that instance, the law absconds away from Defendants characterization
179 that Plaintiff is simply being a petulant law breaker and instead shifts towards the
180 conversation towards characterizations parallel under the whistleblower doctrine:

181 **(First)** 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(iv) states that it is not unlawful for any
182 person to intercept a wire or electronic communication which is being used to
183 facilitate a crime. **(Second)** a party who happens upon evidence of a crime and
184 preserves it is generally protected under the "Public Interest" exception, **(Third)**
185 while usually applied to Attorney-Client privilege, the Crime-Fraud Exception is a
186 broader doctrine that states no privilege or privacy protection exists for
187 communications made in the commission or concealment of a crime. **(Fourth)**
188 *United States v. Leon* 468 U.S. 897 (1984) provides that Plaintiff's reasonably
189 belief that his actions were necessary to document a crime, Plaintiff would lack
190 the *mens rea* for a second crime to be established. Fifth, *United States v. Steiger*,
191 *318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003)*(finding that even if a private party's search was
192 unauthorized, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the person was not
193 a government agent, and the evidence was admissible) and; **(Sixth)** CA PC §
194 632(d) states that while "*confidential communications*" are usually inadmissible if

195 recorded, they are admissible in a proceeding *"for the purpose of proving the*
196 *commission of a felony."*

197 //

198 **VI. The Van Buren Shield (The "Supreme Court" Argument)**

199 **Authorized Access:** Under *Van Buren v. United States*, the security "gates"
200 were up. In *Walsh v. Rokoko*, there were no "gates". Plaintiff had authorized
201 access to the suit(s) he own[ed], has an authorized user account, was expressly
202 authorized to use the software and was a party to the communications.

203 **No Circumvention:** Plaintiff did not bypass any security "gates" to access the
204 data; he simply used a passive "magnifying glass" (the MITM proxy software
205 stack) to visualize the communications he was already privy to. *Van Buren* makes
206 it clear that using authorized access for a purpose the company dislikes is not a
207 crime.

208 //

209 **VII. Rokoko Must Engage An Expert Moving Forward**

210 Pursuant to FRCP 12(f), the Court may strike "redundant, immaterial,
211 impertinent, or scandalous matter." Rokoko continues to weaponize scandalous and
212 baseless claims—labeling evidence "fabricated and fanciful"—while repeatedly
213 refusing to engage competent experts to interpret the data. Instead of addressing
214 the merits, Defendants have launched a defamatory campaign outside the Court,

215 disparaging Plaintiff to an audience of 10 million by calling him "crazy" and
216 accusing him of fraud. Because Rokoko lacks expert testimony to refute the
217 evidence, they have resorted to attacking the material as "inadmissible", "illegal",
218 "felonious" and attacking Plaintiff personally. These unfounded assertions serve
219 only to prejudice the record and should be stricken and a protective order entered
220 against future statements. Courts continuously find that litigants cannot answer
221 technical questions outside of the knowledge of a layperson and *must be addressed*
222 *by expert testimony*. Many of these cases resulted in disposition at summary
223 judgment due to this very fact. The same should be found here as well in the
224 interest of judicial economy. (*see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,*
225 *Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), Chastain v. Poynter Law Group, No. 2:18-cv-01254*
226 *(C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2020), Smash Technology, LLC v. Smash Solutions, LLC, 335*
227 *F.R.D. 438 (D. Utah 2020), M2M Solutions LLC v. Motorola Solutions, Inc., 167*
228 *F. Supp. 3d 673 (D. Del. 2016), Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern*
229 *California, 55 Cal. 4th 747 (2012), Federal Rule of Evidence 702: Explicitly*
230 *requires that scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge be provided by a*
231 *qualified expert*)

232
233 **CONCLUSION**

234 Plaintiff didn't "hack" anything. He observed his own data. Defense Counsel
235 doesn't understand the technology they accuse Plaintiff of misusing while
236 remaining disinterested in having constructive conversations regarding it. Rokoko
237 has refused discovery, while simultaneously calling the Plaintiff a criminal for
238 looking at the very data they said he already had in his possession — which, if
239 anything, exposes their conduct. Rokoko must be stopped from continuing to make
240 these baseless claims, if they wish to continue, they should be made to do so
241 through expert opinion, not attorney argument lacking factual basis and threshold
242 understanding of basic technology function.

243
244 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

245 Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court:

- 246
- 247 1. STRIKE Defendants evidentiary objections in (Dkt #173-3) which conflict
248 with the principles in this motion.
 - 249
250 2. ENTER a protective order so that Defendant may no longer assert claims of
251 computer hacking, nor felony statutes in relation thereof.
- 252

253 3. ORDER that the Defendant must retain an expert witness if they wish to
254 continue challenging the Plaintiff's expertise or credibility in relation to the
255 technological concepts placed before the Court.

256
257 4. ORDER the Defendant to pay Plaintiff expert fees, costs or sanctions due to
258 the harmful accusations and the need to prepare this motion.

259
260 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
261 that the foregoing is true and correct.

262
263 Executed March 8, 2026

264
265 

Matthew R. Walsh
Plaintiff In Pro Per